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Experimental fusion facilities present a variety of 
hazards to the operators and staff.  There are unique or 
specialized hazards, including magnetic fields, cryogens, 
radio frequency emissions, and vacuum reservoirs.  There 
are also more general industrial hazards, such as a wide 
variety of electrical power, pressurized air and cooling 
water systems in use, there are crane and hoist loads, 
working at height, and handling compressed gas 
cylinders.  This paper outlines the projectile hazard 
associated with compressed gas cylinders and methods of 
treatment to provide for compressed gas safety.  This 
information should be of interest to personnel at both 
magnetic and inertial fusion experiments. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Steel cylinders of compressed industrial gases are 
used at virtually all fusion experiments.   Nitrogen is used 
as a fill gas in vacuum vessels and in gloveboxes to 
reduce intrusion of humid room air, hydrogen and 
deuterium gases are used as fuel sources, and P-10 gas 
(10% by volume methane and 90% argon) is used for a 
cover gas in radiation counters such as ionization 
chambers and portal-type contamination monitors.  
Sometimes halon gas or carbon dioxide gas is used as a 
fire suppression gas.  Other gases may be used to cool 
diagnostic devices or as lasing gases for laser diagnostics; 
choices include carbon dioxide, neon, argon, and others.  
A typical 140 cm tall by 23 cm diameter gas cylinder 
from a gas supply company is pressurized to ~13 MPa 
(2,000 psia) and weighs about 62 kg (136 pounds).  In the 
press of experiment activity, proper treatment of gas 
cylinders can be overlooked.  Cylinders might be secured 
well to sturdy structural members, they may be tied with a 
piece of binder twine, or they may be left free standing.  
The reasons for compressed gas safety, some recent 
events involving gas cylinders and compressed gas, and 
suggested methods for treating gases are discussed in this 
paper.     
II.  COMPRESSED GAS HAZARDS 
There are a number of hazards with compressed gas 
use and handling.  Some are obvious and some are not.  
Lees1 described some of these hazards.  The most 
frequent hazard is misidentification of the gas in the 
cylinder, leading to introduction of a gas that is not 
appropriate for the application.  Gas cylinders are often 
color-coded or tag labeled, but the paint or label can rub 
off, or be mistaken, or be misunderstood.  Cylinders can 
be overfilled, either by faults in the filling machinery or 
by human error.  Another hazard is that the cylinder 
isolation valve, usually brass, can be easily damaged.  If 
the valve is damaged badly, it can allow gas to directly 
flow from the cylinder, in which case the cylinder can 
become a projectile propelled by escaping gas.  There are 
other hazards as well.  Gas cylinders tend to be heavy, 
and are sometimes dropped when being handled.  A 62 kg 
item can damage a diagnostic device, a vacuum pump 
line, etc., if it topples over or is dropped.  Toppling 
cylinders have pinched workers’ hands, some events 
resulting in broken bones and amputated fingers, as seen 
in the Department of Energy’s Computerized 
Accident/Incident Reporting System (DOE CAIRS).  
CAIRS also has dozens of reports, over twenty years, 
regarding broken teeth, broken mandibles, and facial 
lacerations resulting from workers trying to pick up gas 
cylinders by the cap; cap failures are usually from 
insufficient threads engaged, worn threads, or a cracked 
cap wall.  Another hazard is gas leakage that can displace 
the air in the room; hence oxygen monitors or toxic gas 
monitors are often installed for personnel protection in 
gas storage areas.  If a gas is flammable, then leakage 
poses the additional hazard of fire or explosion. 
Asfahl2 noted the projectile hazard and gave this 
description:  “It is difficult to comprehend the energy that 
can be released by the sudden rupture of the valve on an 
oxygen cylinder containing 13 MPa pressure …. consider 
the hazard of a heavy cylinder flying wildly around the 
room like a rapidly deflating balloon.”  Asfahl makes a 
compelling case about the non-obvious hazard of stored 
pressure energy.  The scenario seems improbable, but an 
operating experience review indicates that the events are 
not as rare as we would hope and that a few of these 
runaway cylinder events have occurred within the US 
DOE complex in the last 14 years.   
Guymon3 stated that gas cylinder projectiles can 
damage safety instrumentation or electrical lines, break 
small pipe lines, damage valve operators or other 
appendages of large pipe lines, and pumps, valves or 
other equipment could be made inoperable from impact 
with a gas cylinder missile.  In addition, personnel could 
be injured or killed.   
III.  COMPRESSED GAS CYLINDER PROJECTILES 
Guymon3 described a few gas cylinder projectile 
incidents.  A noteworthy event occurred when a 
technician was removing a halon 1211 cylinder as part of 
a system decommissioning task.  The technician either 
caught his sleeve on the manual actuation lever, or his 
forearm brushed the lever.  The cylinder began to release 
its 4 MPa (600 psi) nitrogen cover gas and the pressure-
liquefied halon gas.  The cylinder began bouncing along 
the floor, where it lost its isolation valve.  At that point, 
the cylinder became airborne and traveled upward.  It 
struck a roof access platform and ricocheted, penetrating 
two sheet metal walls to enter an adjacent building.  The 
cylinder angled upward again and penetrated the sheet 
metal roof of the second building.  The cylinder rose up to 
about 43 m (140 feet); it fell back to earth after its gas 
was expended.  In its fall, the cylinder again penetrated 
the sheet metal roof at about 40 m from where it had first 
released gas.   
Another event involving halon was described by the 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.4  Two technicians 
were performing a biennial surveillance on the plant’s 
halon gas cylinders.  The cylinders, which were nominally 
1 m long and 0.4 m in diameter, were pressurized to 
2.4 MPa with 86 kg of Halon and weighed about 159 kg 
(350 pounds) when fully charged.  The technicians 
removed a cylinder to weigh it; this task is part of periodic 
test surveillance, weighing determines if the cylinder has 
retained its correct halon inventory.  To weigh the cylinder, 
the technicians moved the cylinder to a shower/restroom 
area where scales were kept.  A technician removed 
fittings, as per procedures, so they would not be weighed.  
He inadvertently removed a valve fitting that allowed the 
cylinder to vent.  The cylinder began moving, and the two 
technicians were injured, one seriously, as a result of 
impacts.  Extensive damage was also caused in the shower 
and restroom; gouges were made in the tile of a shower 
wall and a 5-cm deep gouge was made in the concrete 
floor.  Then the halon cylinder penetrated a 0.15-m thick 
cinder block wall, leaving an opening approximately 
0.1 m2.
Failure Analysis Associates5 investigated the failure 
of a self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) cylinder 
in 1996.  The 30 MPa (4,500 psig) cylinder was an 
aluminum inner liner with a fiberglass composite outer 
wrapping; its volume was 0.009 m3.  The fiberglass 
suffered stress corrosion cracking initiated by an 
inadvertent chemical exposure to a metal cleaning 
solvent.  Without the fiberglass composite support, the 
liner could not withstand the pressure.  The SCBA 
catastrophically failed several days after the chemical 
exposure.  The cylinder was stored in a compartment on 
the side of a fire engine; the compartment steel door was 
forced from its hinges and badly deformed in this pressure 
explosion, and an adjacent compartment door was also 
blown open and slightly deformed.  The flying debris also 
damaged the other fire engine parked next to 
compartment.  No personnel were nearby at the time of 
the failure; no one was injured. 
The Center for Chemical Process Safety6 described a 
recent fire suppression system event involving a tank of 
“FM-200” gas (heptafluoropropane gas, typical storage 
pressure is 2.5 MPa) at an industrial facility.  An operator 
was removing two cylinders from service, and one 
cylinder valve was accidentally tripped open.  The 
cylinder launched itself upward and penetrated the sheet 
metal roof of the building.  It expended its gas and fell 
back onto the roof.  A similar event with a halon gas 
cylinder occurred at an accelerator facility in 2002.7
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health published some safety guidance on gas cylinders.8
An event from the 1960’s was described where six carbon 
dioxide fire suppressant cylinders had been moved to 
allow wall painting.  Upon reinstallation, a cylinder valve 
separated (due to past damage) while a painter was 
moving the cylinder back into position.  The moving 
cylinder knocked another painter from a scaffold, 
caromed off walls, and made its way into a nearby truck 
well where it expended its remaining pressure energy by 
spinning and impacting the concrete walls.   
The US DOE Occurrence Reporting and Processing 
System (ORPS) (located at http://tis.eh.doe.gov) has 
several gas cylinder reports pertinent to this discussion, as 
well other reports of pinhole leaks through cylinder walls, 
leaking valves, wrong gases plumbed to a system, 
radiological contamination on cylinders, wrong pressures 
applied, wrong markings on cylinders, cylinder missed 
hydrostatic tests, etc.  The compressed gas events that 
resulted in missiles are described briefly in Table I. 
The operating experiences from Table I illustrate that 
there have been only a few reported compressed gas 
cylinder leaks and “missiles” in the past ~14 years of 
DOE ORPS reporting.  Considering the scope of 
operations by the ~130,000 employees in the 24 national 
laboratories and technology centers across the DOE 
complex, the frequency gas cylinder problems is low.  
None of the events described in Table I resulted in a 
TABLE I.  Summaries of Compressed Gas Projectile Events in the DOE ORPS 
Near Miss – Pressurized Respirator Bottle Unexpectedly Discharges Causing Minor Injuries
On April 20, 2004, a technician was performing a routine bottle changing operation.  As he was tightening a regulator and 
hose to a fresh respirator bottle, the bottle valve was ejected by the 20 MPa bottle pressure.  The valve and regulator impacted
a room wall and penetrated two dry wall surfaces to enter the next room, where it ricocheted from a metal shelf and fell back 
into the original room.  The bottle accelerated and struck the technician on the upper thigh, moving him back several feet, 
then its gas was expended.  The technician experienced contusions to the leg and hip, a second individual was knocked over, 
the technician and other personnel in the room were exposed to the loud noise of the bottle valve failure.  Examination 
showed material damage to both the bottle and the valve threads; the cause could not be determined.  The torque to tighten 
the regulator caused the damaged threads to give way, launching the bottle and the valve. 
Compressed Gas (Argon) Bottle Falls Breaking Regulator – almost a runaway cylinder
On March 8, 2000, a subcontractor sheet metal worker was re-positioning welding leads/argon hose for a welding activity.  
As the worker pulled and moved the leads, the connected argon cylinder (compressed gas) fell over out of its containment 
cart and landed on the floor.  When the cylinder struck the floor, the stem connection from the regulator was broken and 
separated from the cylinder.  The cylinder was at approximately 5.4 MPa; the argon gas began escaping vertically from the 
cylinder nozzle.  A nearby safety representative witnessed the event, hesitated a few seconds to determine that the cylinder 
was not going to move, then approached the cylinder and closed the cylinder valve.  There were no injuries to personnel or 
damage to property as a result of this incident.  
Two Firefighters Injured while Discharging CO2 Cylinder
On December 8, 1998, in preparation for hydro testing of a CO2 cylinder, a firefighter inadvertently actuated the trigger 
mechanism on a CO2 cylinder.  This action caused the 5.4 MPa CO2 cylinder to discharge, propelling it from a cart the 
workers had used to transport it to a parking area.  The cylinder spun out of control in the parking lot and struck one of the 
fire fighters in the calf, causing a laceration.  The other firefighter fell as he was evading the cylinder; he received elbow and 
knee abrasions.  One firefighter was transported to the hospital and the other was treated at the site clinic.  The cylinder did
not cause any other damage.  The CAIRS report on this event indicated that the hospitalized firefighter had complications 
from the laceration; there was a significant amount of lost work time (> 0.3 year) to properly heal. 
Accident resulting in minor injury to an employee (near miss)  almost a runaway cylinder
On June 18, 1996, two employees were assigned to perform piping pressure tests.  The task required moving a 13 MPa 
nitrogen gas cylinder to the test location.  They carted the cylinder, with cap attached, to a stairwell.  They uncarted the 
cylinder and began to slide it down the stairs; one employee was above and one was below.  They lost control of the cylinder; 
it struck one employee as it slid down the stairway, he fell about 3-4 steps to the landing.  The cylinder rolled about 14 or 16
steps and stopped on the landing; the cap had been dislodged and the valve stem was sheared at the packing nut.  No nitrogen 
escaped, but this was a near miss as a valve loss accident.  The cylinder was removed to the outdoors, vented and discarded.   
Near Miss – Carbon Dioxide Cylinder Incident
On September 20, 1995, a 45.5 kg CO2 compressed gas cylinder (estimated to be 5.7 MPa) escaped its storage location at the 
north side of a lab building following an uncontrolled release of CO2.  Two Fire Department (FD) workers narrowly escaped 
injury when the cylinder exited the storage enclosure.  The workers were conducting a task pre-planning evolution for the 
removal of all CO2 compressed gas cylinders from the cylinder storage area of an obsolete, fixed fire protection system.  No 
other personnel were in the area when the cylinder propelled itself out of the storage enclosure, striking a paved parking area
and spinning out of control.  After striking the ground the cylinder traveled about 9 m (30 feet) and struck an inclined 
concrete ramp, which restricted further movement.  The cylinder came to rest following the release of its contents.  The FD 
workers stated they intended to examine the use of a hand lever attachment, which is connected to the valve assembly, as a 
means of discharging the cylinder contents.  A general lack of knowledge regarding cylinder discharge valve design and 
intent, coupled with the failure to recognize that the cylinder was improperly restrained, initiated this event.  
Damage to Unsecured Gas Cylinder – almost a runaway cylinder
On December 5, 1990, a subcontractor electrician had removed a 13 MPa argon gas cylinder from a welding cart to gain 
access to the cart’s electrical panel.  The cart rolled down a slight incline, putting tension on the gas hose that was still 
connected to the argon cylinder.  The cylinder was pulled over.  The regulator stem was broken off in the fall, but no gas 
escaped from the cylinder.  There were no injuries although an employee was only ~1.5 m away from the falling cylinder. 
process gas (e.g., nitrogen, P-10, argon, helium, etc.) having 
a valve loss and becoming a missile inside a facility.  There 
were; however, three reports of ‘near miss’ missile events 
involving two argon cylinders and one nitrogen cylinder.  
There was also one event of a SCBA respirator cylinder 
becoming a missile.  There were two carbon dioxide 
suppression gas events that led to cylinder missiles.  
Qualitatively, the gas cylinder missile events seem to be rare, 
but nonetheless three events and three near misses have 
occurred within the 14-year time span of the ORPS database.  
An initial estimate of the occurrence frequency of a gas 
cylinder missile at an individual DOE lab or research 
complex would be an unlikely event (1E-02 to 1E-04/year).  
While gas cylinder ‘missile’ events may be rare, the 
consequences can be severe.  It is positive that there have not 
been any gas cylinder events reported at fusion facilities; 
however, not all events may be reaching the database. 
IV.  COMPRESSED GAS SAFETY 
The main issue in gas cylinder safety is to treat the gas 
cylinders with respect, remembering what sort of damage a 
mistreated cylinder can create.  The following section shows 
how much thrust and what velocity can be reached with 
these cylinders.  Another issue is proper cylinder restraint.  
At some fusion experiments, simple cords or twine have 
been used to secure cylinders.  While the gas cylinder 
regulations (29CFR1910.101) and Compressed Gas 
Association guidance9 do not state what type of restraint to 
use, the construction safety regulations (29CFR1926.350) do 
state that a cylinder truck or chains should be used to prevent 
cylinders from falling over.  There are several reasons for 
using chains.  If a cylinder were to begin to whirl around on 
its axis due to a leak, a chain will continue to confine the 
cylinder well.  If a rope or cord begins to bind on a whirling 
cylinder, the force may part the restraint and allow the 
cylinder to fall over.  Metal chain is also typically much 
stronger than stranded rope or cord.  Chains wear better than 
rope, and a hook connection with a chain is always the same, 
which is not uniformly true of worker knot tying proficiency 
with twine, rope, or cord.  In a fire situation, typically under 
1,000°C, steel chains retain a fair amount of their yield 
strength; if the pressure relief fusible link on the gas cylinder 
opens in the fire then the cylinder needs to be well-restrained 
so it does not fall over and move, which could easily add 
more damage and potentially spread the fire already in 
progress.  The pressure relief fusible link is designed to 
direct escaping gas in four directions, each 90q from the 
other, so that there is no net thrust in any direction.  If there 
is pressure relief nozzle fouling, or partial link melting, then 
there will be unbalanced thrust that can cause the cylinder to 
whirl or tip over.  Another issue to consider is that the rope 
or cord can burn or melt in a fire, leaving the cylinder 
freestanding as it is being overheated.  There is no rule on 
what type of chain to use, and the entire range of flimsy 
(decorative or pet-walking chain) to robust (vehicle towing  
chain) has been seen in use in various facilities.  Safety 
guidance is to select a chain that will restrain the 
cylinder in an earthquake situation;10 thus, an 
obviously lightweight chain will not provide adequate 
restraint.  Chen10 stated that 100 gas cylinders, 
improperly restrained, failed during the 6.6 Richter 
magnitude Northridge earthquake near Los Angeles, 
California in January 1994.  These cylinders added 
their gas release to the other chemical releases from 
broken chemical containers in laboratories and 
businesses.   
One of the primary ways to preserve gas cylinders 
is to keep the cylinder interior free of moisture; the 
presence of moisture leads to corrosion of the internal 
walls.  Gas companies wish to use cylinders as long as 
possible and take steps to remove moisture when filling 
the cylinders.  When the users also keep moisture out of 
the cylinders, the cylinders should have long service 
lives.  At the author’s site, there are some gas cylinders 
that have been in service over 60 years, having passed 
their periodic hydrostatic pressure tests.  However, 
these cylinders tend to be rather thick-walled and 
heavier than more modern cylinders.  A typical lifetime 
for a modern steel cylinder is 25-30 years, less if the 
gas is highly corrosive, possibly longer if the cylinder is 
well kept.  Another safety issue is to keep the cylinder 
exterior clean and properly painted, thus avoiding 
external corrosion and promoting the color-coding that 
allows recognition of cylinder contents.  Keeping the 
protective steel cap on the gas cylinder when it is not in 
use protects the brass cylinder valve, which is the 
weakest part of the entire structure. 
Another often-discussed safety issue is the use of a 
flow-restricting orifice.  Gas supply companies are 
reluctant to include such orifices for several reasons: 
cost to retrofit thousands of cylinders for a low 
frequency accident event, the fact that some customers 
do not wish to use orifices, and the increase in the time 
needed to refill an ‘orificed’ cylinder could result in the 
company being uneconomic.  Some companies have an 
orifice available if a customer requests it.  Users can 
also install an orifice after the cylinder valve, as 
suggested by Bolman.11  The best way to protect the gas 
cylinder is to secure it well against any inadvertent 
motion and keep the cylinder isolation valve capped 
whenever possible so that it is not susceptible to 
damage.   
Another safety issue germane to fusion experiments 
is that most gas cylinders are made of ferromagnetic 
steel.  There have been incidents with small gas 
cylinders in the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
community,12,13 some of which have led to fatalities of  
patients who were struck by gas cylinders drawn to the MRI 
magnet.  The sets of magnets in fusion should generate less 
fringe field than a single MRI magnet, but fusion 
experiments have suffered from other magnetic field-induced 
projectiles.  While the 62 kg weight of industrial gas 
cylinders precludes them from being drawn by a magnetic 
field, the cylinders should be positioned out of the fringe 
field and secured against any toppling that might result from 
motion induced by ramping magnetic fields. 
V.  RUNAWAY CYLINDER CALCULATION 
As already stated, a fusion experiment may have several 
kinds of gas cylinders in use.  A safety calculation has been 
performed for a 140 cm tall by 23 cm diameter, 62 kg empty, 
0.05 m3, pressurized gas cylinder at room temperature that 
has had its isolation valve sheared off at the cylinder head.  
Guymon3 has stated the energy release equation for an 
isentropic gas release: 
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where: 
U is the total gas energy released in reversible, adiabatic 
expansion 
P1 is the initial gas pressure in the cylinder 
P2 is the final gas pressure, i.e., atmospheric pressure 
V1 is the volume of the gas cylinder 
J is the ratio of specific heats for the gas 
Lees1 suggested that 91.5 m/s is a practical upper limit 
for the attainable velocity of a typical gas cylinder being 
propelled by its own escaping gas, this value apparently was 
determined from a rocket thrust force equation, such as given 
in reference 14, assuming sonic velocity choked flow in the 
sheared valve.  Solving for the energy release and assuming 
all the energy is converted into kinetic energy gives a 
bounding velocity term for a cylinder, always less than 
91.5 m/s.  Since the gas can fan out after leaving the valve, 
and most likely becomes supersonic flow, Lees’ approach 
can underestimate the velocity.  Table II gives some gas 
property values and Table III gives calculation results for 
gases often used in fusion facilities.  The thrust to weight 
ratios given in Table III vary between 1.3 and 17; any value 
over 1.0 indicates the cylinder can move upward against the 
force of gravity.  In fact, Atlas, Titan, and Delta launch 
vehicles15 have launch pad thrust to weight ratios of 1.2 to 2. 
The velocities reported in Table III are upper bounds, 
since no friction losses from the gas or from the cylinder 
have been accounted for, and no cylinder collisions that 
would transfer the cylinder’s energy to another object have 
been assumed.  Considering that the mass involved is 62 kg,  
the velocities in Table III are ample to cause damage to 
electronics cabinets, diagnostics, small diameter vacuum 
or water piping, ceramic breaks in piping, electrical 
panels, or other sensitive equipment in a fusion facility. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
There have been several reported events of gas 
cylinder projectiles at industrial facilities and power 
station in the recent past.  In the DOE complex there 
have been two reported runaway gas cylinder events, one 
SCBA event, and several near miss events in the past 14 
years.  Runaway or cylinder “missile” events in the US 
DOE are unlikely events in the 1E-02 to 1E-04/year 
frequency range per site.  Enough events have occurred 
that continued diligence with gas cylinders is necessary.  
The event reports have shown that handling of fire 
suppressant gas and welding gas containers is sometimes 
performed by workers who are not well trained in 
handling these gas containers.  This lack of knowledge 
has led to a few 'missile' events.  The recorded data show 
that handling of process gases (nitrogen, argon, helium, 
etc.) has resulted in fewer accidents than handling of the 
welding and fire suppressant gases.  There have not been 
any reported incidents of gas cylinder runaway events at 
fusion facilities, but continued diligence is prudent given 
the potential consequences.  The energy release 
calculations in this paper show that there is considerable 
stored pressure energy that should be respected in each 
cylinder, and the operating experience shows the 
mechanical damage resulting from venting these 
cylinders to air, regardless of any toxic or flammable 
nature of the compressed gas.  The safety practices at all 
facilities using compressed gases could be improved by 
remembering the stored pressure energy and the weight 
of these cylinders.  Proper care in the use and handling 
of compressed gas cylinders will promote safe 
operations at all fusion experiments.   
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